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TAB "A"

G-2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO NIE-9 - "TURKEY"

**II. Strengths and Weaknesses****Military Strengths**

The primary military asset of Turkey is her army, totally 280,000 personnel, organized into 16 Infantry Divisions and three Cavalry Divisions, all at <sup>half strength</sup> 50 percent TO. In addition there are 6 Armored Brigades at full TO, plus supporting and service elements. The present conscript system insures that troops who have recently completed their service are available to raise units to full TO strength and to form additional units up to the limit of Turkish logistical capacity.

The army is primarily a defensive force and is trained in that role. The Turkish peasant has traditionally exhibited great determination to resist any invader, a factor which current organization and training exploit.

*Understanding*

The defensive role of the Turkish Army is aided by favorable terrain both in the East and the West. In the East, the road net is sparse and the terrain tends to canalize invading forces. While it is true that the same sparse road net hinders Turkish capabilities to reinforce from the more populous West, still it is believed that on the whole terrain favors the defense. In the West, the Straits, a major water barrier backed by hilly to mountainous terrain, facilitates defensive action. European Turkey, apart from the Gallipoli Peninsula, unfortunately offers few natural barriers to invasion. On the other hand, the suitable landing beaches for major amphibious landings along the Black Sea are nearly all backed by hilly and mountainous belts which offer good opportunities for denying beach exits.

Since 1948 a United States Military Mission has been engaged in supervising the training of the Turkish Army. During this period a solid ground work has been laid by the creation of a system of training schools. A flow of trained Turkish personnel has been maintained at a high level. On the advice of the U.S. Mission, the Turks have reorganized

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their staff system and the relationship between the General Staff and the Defense Ministry. The delivery of modern materiel has greatly changed the capabilities of the Turkish Ground Forces. This program is continuing, with deliveries during the current year centering on re-equipping Army and Corps Artillery and support and service units. The Mission program during the current year will emphasize inspection of units to insure that doctrine taught in the schools is put into effect in the field. It is expected that the end of the present year will see a much higher level of combat efficiency in field units than heretofore.

To summarize, the basis of Turkish Military strength is her army in being, of which 16 Infantry Divisions, 3 Cavalry Divisions, 6 Armored Brigades form the major units plus supporting and service elements. This army has a tradition of effective defensive action, has recently been reorganized along modern staff lines, is equipped with essential modern materiel, and has a modern school system functioning. Terrain is favorable for the defense of Turkey.

#### Military Weaknesses

The industrial immaturity of the country is the fundamental weakness in the Turkish military organization. This results in an almost complete reliance on outside supplies for materiel and in an absence of a reservoir of civilian personnel trained in running and maintaining mechanized equipment. Furthermore, the current two year conscription period is too short a time to train raw peasantry in the maintenance of modern motor vehicles.

Another major weakness is the current severe shortage of career NCOs and technical sergeants. Budgetary limitation accounts for this shortage and steps are underway to remedy the matter.

*\$4 million allocated*

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Other military weaknesses stem from the inadequate road and rail transport net, despite the effort currently being put into improving this matter, through the U.S. Public Roads Groups and ECA.

Further there is evidence that the Turkish military establishment is not yet operating at full efficiency after the reorganization of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. In addition, some senior Turkish officers are unfamiliar with, or still unconvinced of, the potentialities offered by the new equipment.

#### Political and Sociological Strengths and Weaknesses

The homogeneity of the Turkish nation is an important factor in Turkey's strength. Turkey is now overwhelmingly Moslem and Turkish, and minority groups are limited in numbers and importance. No political party has emerged or been permitted to emerge which advocates anything but the strongest opposition to Soviet aims vis-a-vis Turkey. The Turkish Communist Party is weak and underground, and although a ring of agents is uncovered from time to time, it remains unimportant.

Although urbanization is proceeding apace, rights of trade unions are still limited and there is no effective labor organization suitable for Communists to penetrate. There is some indication, however, that students living abroad have been a target for Communists. There appears to be no weakening in the stability of the nation.

#### Economic Strength and Weaknesses

Compared with other nations in the Balkan/Levant Area, Turkey is relatively strong economically, and given an adequate investment program, could do much to improve her present position. Until recently, all enterprise functioned under a policy of statism, or development by government-owned corporations, owing to a legacy of suspicion towards foreign capital. This has proved expensive and cumbersome and an attempt is currently being made to improve conditions for private business. In addition, under the aegis of ECA, a major program of capital investment is in progress.

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The major economic handicap is the burden resulting from the necessity of maintaining a large standing army. Currently an estimated 36.8 percent of the total budget is expended on defence and security services. This is probably a smaller burden than during World War II, and as a result of the U.S. aid program, it represents better value for the money. However, it remains the major factor in limiting economic development within the country.

#### Turkish Military Capabilities

##### Against Bulgaria

It is estimated that Turkey can hold the naturally strong Gelibolu peninsula and thus deny the use of the exit from the Sea of Marmora to the Aegean Sea. If Turkey feels free to deploy additional troops in the Catalca line west of Istanbul she can possibly hold both this line and Istanbul against an attack by Bulgarian Forces alone. The ability of the Bulgarians to mount an amphibious operation to turn the Bosphorus defenses is questionable. *Bombing of Istanbul*

##### Conclusion

If Turkey feels free to deploy additional forces, she can probably repel an attack by Bulgaria alone and retain portions of European Turkey including Istanbul. Turkey can hold Gelibolu and withstand Bulgarian penetrations across the Bosphorus and Sea of Marmora.

##### Against Soviet and Satellite Attack

##### Eastern Anatolia

Turkish defense planning envisages the use of fixed defenses to hold the key road junction of Erzurum, with other forces holding the passes in the Bitlis area and the coast road from Trabzon. In this area of poor roads and difficult terrain, only very light forces are maintained forward of Erzurum, but it is doubted whether any large mechanized Soviet force could be usefully deployed against Erzurum. Hence, Turkish forces there will be faced with troops having horse drawn equipment similar to their own and will meet them on more nearly equal terms than might be the case elsewhere.

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It is estimated that the Turks will put up a very stubborn resistance with the means at their disposal but that they are only capable of withstanding attacks by relatively minor forces. Against an all-out attack mounted by Soviet Forces, they are not believed to be capable of prolonged resistance but only of delaying action. As the Soviet forces advance, there should be excellent opportunities offered for guerrilla warfare along the lines of communication.

#### Amphibious Landings Along the Black Sea Coast

It is estimated that the Turks can possibly contain amphibious landings either in the Samsun area or other points by defensive action in the hills inland.

#### Thrace and the Straits

The Turks can possibly hold Gelibolu against an all out Soviet attack, and probably cannot hold the Catalca line and Istanbul itself. It is estimated that the Turks can possibly hold the Eastern shore of the Straits against an all-out attack. However, a crossing of the Straits could not be done quickly unless local amphibious landings were made West of Eregli. *Well, why not?*

The Turks are capable of fighting a delaying defensive action inland along the approaches to Ankara. However, it would only be a matter of time and the size of the ground forces at the disposal of the local Soviet commander before most important urban centers were overrun and Turkish resistance limited to redoubt action in the southeast near Iskenderon.

#### The Southeast

The mountainous terrain shielding the port of Iskenderon offers opportunity for resistance by Turkish Forces, which would have to be supplied by sea. Soviet lines of communications would be very vulnerable to guerrilla action based on the rugged terrain and a loyal anti-Soviet country population.

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*how much?*

Turkish capabilities are limited to successful resistance to Bulgarian attack, if redeployment is possible. Against an all-out Soviet attack, Turkey is capable only of stubborn resistance to Soviet forces, delaying Soviet advances inland. She is incapable of successful defense, if the Soviets wish to deploy sufficient strength to occupy the inhabited sections of the country. The Turks are capable of continued guerrilla warfare against Soviet lines of communications and might hold a redoubt area in the southeast, if supplied by sea.

*how much?*

Although it is conceded that the Turks have no capability for all-out defense, it is estimated that with even a medium of outside assistance, particularly air, an attempt to subjugate the country completely could be slow and costly. Hence, any strengthening of the combat capabilities of the Turkish Army can only act as a deterrent to Soviet action in this theatre.

IV. Strategic Importance of Turkey's Alignment

a. Deterrent Effect on Soviet-Satellite Expansion in the Balkans and Middle East

*unlikely (checked by US)*

The U.S.S.R., through control of her Satellites--Rumania and Bulgaria--has land transport routes to Greece and Yugoslavia. Contiguous land frontiers permit military land action against Greece and Yugoslavia without reliance on routes through Turkey. The Turks have shown themselves unwilling to enter into any military agreement with neighboring countries which would obligate them to come to the assistance of those countries in time of war, and, furthermore, Turkey has negligible capabilities for offensive action. Therefore, it is unlikely that Turkey's pre-U.S. attitude is a major consideration affecting Soviet-Satellite expansionism in the Balkans.

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The U.S.S.R. has a contiguous land frontier with Iran and has the option of military occupation of that country at any time if she deems it profitable for the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is unlikely that the pro-U.S. alignment of Turkey is a factor affecting Soviet territorial expansionism in Iran, or for that matter, in the rest of the Middle East. On the other hand, under present circumstances, Turkey's pro-Western alignment and firm anti-Communist stand makes Communist efforts to penetrate and undermine other Governments in the area by subversive tactics more difficult.

b. Turkey's Role with Respect to Specific U.S. Strategic Interests

(1) Turkish Control of the Straits

Continued Turkish control of the Straits allows her to limit, if she sees fit, their use as a passage for Black-Sea-based submarines seeking to operate against sea traffic in the Mediterranean. This could be very important to U.S. interests, since the construction of the new oil lines to the Levant Coast renders tanker traffic extremely vulnerable to submarine action by Soviet submarines operating from the Black Sea. Turkey could also interdict surface supply ships supporting Soviet military activities in the Aegean/Adriatic area.

~~If the Turks allowed free passage for Soviet submarines through the Straits, Western sea traffic would be exposed to constant submarine threat. The Soviets would also be able to support land operations in the Adriatic-Aegean area by means of sea transport.~~

(2) Turkish Protection to Middle East Oil

Turkey by itself affords very little protection to the oil fields and refineries in the Middle East, ~~for example~~, although the Turkish position does afford some protection to the oil pipe line from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to eastern Mediterranean termini.

In conjunction with other Western forces, the Turks would provide a considerable threat to the flank of a Soviet move into the oil producing areas and a deterrent to a Soviet attack.

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**SECRET****(3) Turkish Attitude to Granting Bases to the U.S.**

6.c.  
It is obvious that the granting of forward air bases in Turkey would greatly increase the capabilities of the U.S. Air Force units undertaking offensive action against the Soviets. The Turks <sup>almost certainly</sup> would ~~probably~~ be willing to grant base rights to the U.S. <sup>if</sup> ~~provided~~ ~~Turkey were attacked or~~ the U.S. made a definite commitment to assist Turkey in case she were attacked, or if the US actually came to Turkey's assistance in the event of an attack.

**(4) Main Effect of Change in Turkish Alignment**

Use of Turkish forces in Strait of Suez, etc.  
If the Soviets were able to use the Turkish rail and road system from Istanbul to Iskenderun, the logistical problems of supporting Soviet forces which were passing down the Levant coast in route to Suez would be materially lessened.

**c. Psychological Impact of Turkey's Alignment on Other Balkan-Middle East Countries**

The firm anti-Communist stand and pro-Western position of Turkey serves to bolster the pro-Western sentiment in adjacent countries. A reversal of Turkey's position in this regard would undermine the existing pro-Western sentiment, particularly in the Arab area.

**V. Probable Turkish Courses of Action in the Event of War and the Implications Thereof****a. Turkish Reaction to Soviet or Satellite Assault on Turkey****(1) Isolated Action Against Turkey as a Whole**

Turkey will resist any attack on her territory to the utmost of her capabilities.

**(2) Isolated Action Against the Straits Area Only**

As above.

**(3) Action Against Turkey as a Part of a General War**

As above.

**b. Turkish Reaction to Isolated Soviet or Satellite Action Against a Nearby Country****Iran**

Should Soviet forces attack Iran, and a general war not break

out at once, there are no indications that Turkey would take any action against the Soviet Union.

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reason for intervention. On the contrary, there are indications that the Turks view Iranian capabilities for defense against Soviet attack as low that they would be very reluctant to intervene in any way.

#### Greece

Despite the preliminary staff talks which have been undertaken between the Greek General Staff and the Turkish General Staff, the Turks are not likely to commit themselves to any joint action with Greece unless a definite prior commitment to aid Turkey has been made by the NATO Powers.

#### Yugoslavia

There are no indications that Turkey would come to the assistance of Yugoslavia.

#### Other Targets

In the event of Communist-inspired aggression against either a distant/country, which called for U.N. action similar to that in Korea, Turkey can be expected to offer military forces for use by the U.N. against the aggressor. *in view of Greece?*

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